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Wage Inequality, Linkages and FDI
* 
 
This paper extends the existing literature on FDI and wage inequality. We do this in two 
ways. Firstly, we incorporate more precise measures of inward investment into the model, by 
allowing for differences in the effects between horizontal and vertical FDI. Secondly, after 
establishing the effects that inward investment has on wage inequality, we then analyse the 
reasons for this in terms of the wages paid to skilled and unskilled workers, and the effect 
that inward investment has on this. We illustrate the important differences that horizontal and 
vertical FDI have on both wages and wage inequality, and the importance of allowing for 
regional differences in the results. FDI nationally tends to increase wage inequality, while the 
local, effects are opposite. FDI into assisted areas tends to increase wage inequality 
nationally, when the MNEs purchase inputs in the local region. 
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I.  Introduction 
Over the past two decades a number of studies have documented the relative decline in 
unskilled wages for a number of countries, see Katz and Autor (1999) for a comprehensive 
review. The general consensus is that this has resulted from increasing demand for higher 
skilled labour. This phenomenon has occurred within industries and narrowly defined skill 
groups in the US and UK, Katz and Autor (1999), Taylor (2006). The two most common 
explanations behind such a demand shift are exogenous and endogenous technological 
change, biased in favour of skilled labour and growing international trade (Acemoglu, 2002).
1  
Both trade and the pace of technological change have arguably accelerated over the 
past two decades, however foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) both into and out of the UK has also grown at a rapid rate in recent years, such that 
investment by foreign firms has accounted for approximately 28% of total manufacturing 
investment in the UK
2.  Equally, as Machin and Van Reenen (1998) and others have reported, 
wage inequality has increased over the period, not just in the UK but internationally. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents both the theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the links between FDI and wages / wage inequality. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical model, and the decomposition of the wage effects. Section 4 presents the data, and 
section 5 discusses the estimation in some detail. The final sections offer some discussion of 
the results and some conclusions.  
IIi.   Theoretical analysis of  FDI and  wage inequality 
As we discuss below in detail, there is very little formal theoretical analysis of the impact of 
inward investment on wage inequality. Rather, the empirical literature that exists relies on the 
more conceptual literature that seeks to explain FDI in terms of technology differences 
                                                 
1 Note other potential causes of wage inequality capable of explaining within industry changes are: skill biased 
occupational changes, Caroli and Van Reenen (2001); relative supply shifts with a fall in the growth rate of 
educational attainment amongst cohorts born after the 1950s, Card and Lemieux (2000) and Gosling et al. 
(2000); and institutional changes such as weakening union strength, Machin (1997). 
2 Authors’ calculations based on ABI data, various years   2 
between the host sector and the inward investors, or the wholly empirical “trade versus 
technology” debate. However, there are more formal treatments that can inform our study. For 
example, in a different context Bresnahan (1999) argues that computer use, and the 
subsequent impact of “white collar” productivity explains wage inequality in the West, while 
others discussed below focus on the trade issue, and the bidding down of unskilled wages.  
Perhaps the best known theoretical treatment of inward investment and linkages is 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996). This shows that where inward investors purchase inputs from 
indigenous suppliers, then the developmental effects of this inward investment are all the 
greater. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) relates the extent of linkages between inward investors and 
domestic firms to the cost of communication between the head office of the MNE and the 
local subsidiary. Markusen and Venables (1996) extend the theoretical basis for the 
importance of agglomeration, showing that inward investment into a region will not only 
stimulate domestic activity, but that this domestic development may eventually replace the 
original FDI. There are, to the best of our knowledge no formal extensions of this that 
examine wage dispersion or inequality explicity, either in terms of direct or indirect effects. 
However, there are theoretical treatments of the impacts of FDI more generally. Wang and 
Blomstrom (1992) for example present a model of technology transfer from FDI, and show 
that effort is required by recipient firms, in the form of human capital. This suggests that 
workers with more human capital will appropriate more of the beneficial effects of FDI than 
unskilled workers. An extension to this is provided by Zhao (1998), who presents a model 
that examines the impact of FDI on wages and employment more directly. By focussing on 
the firm specific nature of FDI, Zhao (1998) shows that inward investment provides more 
scope for union bargaining at the firm level, such that the union can bargain with more firms, 
and hence wages rise. An assumption of this model however is that full employment prevails, 
such that again the relative effects of FDI on different types of workers depend on the relative   3 
supply of the different types of labour. The inference from Zhao (1998) being that inward FDI 
benefits those workers with greater bargaining power.  
This is related to the theoretical literature concerned with explaining FDI flows, see 
for example recent work by Braconier et al. (2005) and Mugele and Schnitzer (2006) which 
highlights the importance of considering “vertical” as well as horizontal FDI. In the 
theoretical literature, this means relating the location of internationally mobile activities to the 
relative cost of production, but this can be extended. Rather than simply considering the 
internal cost of production, it is also necessary to consider the local production by the inward 
investor, and local purchasing and selling by the inward investor in terms of the effects of 
FDI.  This result is dependent on linkage effects, but the impact of FDI and input-output 
linkages has not been explored in the context of wage inequality, as equally the inter-regional 
effects of transaction linkages on relative wages also remain unexplored.  
The more formal treatments of wage dispersion or inter-industry wage differentials 
tend to focus on search theory to explain these apparent differences across industry 
Montgomery (1991). This literature stresses two important concepts in explaining wage 
differentials. The first is heterogeneity, specifically at the firm level when explaining intra-
industry differences. The second, and perhaps more important in many of the theoretical 
treatments is the search behaviour, of both firms and workers.  For example, as Montgomery 
(1991) shows, the probability of a firm filling a given vacancy with a worker of appropriate 
skills, is endogenously determined with the wage that the firm decides to offer. Montgomery 
shows formally that even in a thick homogenous labour market, the search behaviour required 
to fill a given vacancy will lead to wage inequality. When one considers the earlier treatments 
of this problem by Lang (1991) or Weitzman (1989) that show the importance of firms 
offering higher wages to increase the probability of hiring, the links to the formal theories of 
FDI discussed above becomes more apparent. Acemoglu (1999) builds on the search theory   4 
approach. Acemoglu’s (1999) treatment includes the notion of skill based technical change, 
causing a change in the job composition and therefore a greater return for (scarce) skilled 
workers. Acemoglu (1999) however extends this argument more formally to include 
searching behaviour. Where search (by either the firm or the worker) is costly, firms also 
engage in more screening behaviour, focussing on the best candidates, and in turn “casting 
their net wider”. In terms of a model of the UK labour market, this suggests that inter-regional 
effects will be greater for skilled workers than unskilled ones. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) 
show how a search model, including on-the-job search will lead to wage dispersion, even 
between homogeneous workers. They show that the worker specific match to a firms 
productivity is the main driver of earnings of workers, with workers who believe that they are 
“under matched” seeking a better match while in employment. This is consistent with much 
of the evidence on the impacts of FDI on labour markets (for a discussion of this literature see 
Driffield and Taylor, 2000) that suggests where inward investors recruit (for a greenfield site 
for example) they do not recruit from the pool of unemployed, but from the employed. This 
increases labour market competition, especially for skilled workers. This is consistent with the 
findings of Groshen (1991) who shows that a big driver of wage dispersion is the firm level 
characteristics. This again confirms earlier studies of inward investors, suggesting that they 
pay higher wages due to their higher productivity.It should be noted here that the formal 
explanations or theoretical treatments of wage inequality focus on explaining differences in 
earnings between seemingly homogeneous workers. These all point towards firm level 
characteristics as being key drivers of wage differentials, with the search costs borne by the 
individuals. Recently, Mortensen (2009) demonstrates that a crucial factor in the theoretical 
treatment of wage dispersion is firm heterogeneity, and the  positive cross firm correlation 
between wages and productivity. This is important when looking at the impact of new 
(foreign owned) entry on wage inequality. In a market encompassing heterogeneous firms,   5 
and focussing on the impact of inward investors, this search process becomes more important. 
Most theories of FDI (see for example Dunning, 1979) focus on the uncertainty associated 
with entering a foreign market. In such circumstances, the search behaviour of both the firm 
and the employee becomes even more important.  
The rather small theoretical literature discussed here has a further limitation, in that it 
ignores the endogeneity of FDI. Increased wage inequality is generally associated with labour 
market flexibility, on the basis that labour market flexibility increases the relative return to 
skilled workers. This occurs through inter-industry and regional mobility, but also it is argued 
that skilled workers are better able to reallocate activity and respond to shocks. Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005) show that location choice, and the volume of FDI are positively related to 
labour market flexibility in the host country and to the difference between labour market 
regulations in the host and the source countries. A more flexible labour market in the host 
economy (relative to the investor’s home country) is associated with a higher likelihood of 
investment. As such therefore, it is likely that inward investment is attracted to the UK due to 
its relatively high level of labour market flexibility, and that this is associated with an 
increased demand for low skill (low wage) workers. 
IIii.   Empirical analysis of FDI and wage dispersion and some extensions 
Previous studies, see Greenaway and Nelson (2001) for a survey, have shown that inward 
investment bids up skilled wages in the domestic sector, thus increasing wage inequality, not 
only in the region of the investment, but in the surrounding regions. This is an important issue 
for policy makers, as concern has been expressed that both skill shortages and labour market 
tightening have been exacerbated in certain parts of the country by inward investment. 
While there are a growing number of studies that look at the impacts of foreign 
acquisition on wages or wage inequality, see for example Girma and Görg (2007) or Huttenen 
(2007), to our knowledge there has not been any systematic investigation into the impact of   6 
FDI upon growing UK wage inequality which highlights regional effects as well as the 
influence of forward and backward linkages. Work examining the aggregate effects of FDI 
upon wage inequality include: Taylor and Driffield (2005) for the UK; Figini and Gorg (1999) 
for Ireland; Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) for the USA and Bandick and Hansson (2005) for 
Sweden. In response, this paper examines the impact of inward FDI upon relative wages in 
UK manufacturing industries employing highly disaggregated firm level data and makes the 
contribution of examining both the regional and industry level effects of FDI on wage 
inequality, and also considers forward and backward linkage inter-industry effects. 
Previous work has pointed to FDI acting to increase wage inequality within the 
industry concerned, (e.g. Taylor and Driffield, 2005, Figini and Görg, 1999). The explanation 
for this is two fold, based on both technology and labour market effects (Driffield and Girma, 
2003). The analysis for backwardly linked FDI is therefore similar. Inward investors 
purchasing inputs from domestic producers is associated with technology transfer, and is 
therefore likely to increase the returns to skilled workers in those sectors. Görg and Strobl 
(2002) for example relate entry by domestic firms to inward investment, ascribing this to 
linkage effects, though the implications for wage inequality are less clear. The more recent 
outsourcing literature suggests that inward investors purchasing from upstream suppliers may 
be increasing the relative demand for unskilled workers in those industries, as they seek to 
buy in low skill inputs. In such cases, backwardly linked FDI could reduce wage inequality in 
upstream sectors.  
Finally, forward linkages and FDI (foreign firms selling to the domestic sector) have 
seldom been examined in any context. Driffield et al. (2003) associate this with productivity 
growth in the downstream domestic sector, but the impacts on wage inequality are less clear. 
In terms of the literature on FDI flows, inward investors in the UK that are seeking to sell 
domestic companies could be labelled as “market seeking”. Such FDI is generally associated   7 
with crowding out effects rather than spillover effects, so the relative wage effect may be 
moderate compared with the absolute employment effect.  
The regional dimension is expected to be important here and has previously been 
overlooked. The literature on wage spillovers suggests that the labour market effects of capital 
investment or external wage changes are relatively limited geographically, so we expect 
different effects within the locality of the investment compared with national effects. Such 
differences are compounded by the fact that many purchasing relationships between inward 
investors and domestic firms tend to be local, while industry level crowding out effects for 
example are more likely to be national.  
However, the labour demand effects cannot be ignored. While theoretical motivations 
for FDI tend to focus on technology differences between home and host country firms, 
relative labour costs are also important. The UK has attracted a high proportion of FDI into 
Europe  despite being an R&D intensive country, because it has (by European standards) 
flexible labour markets, while many regions of the UK are characterised by relatively low 
wages. As such, some inward investors attracted to the UK because of relatively low wages 
may tend to increase demand for relatively unskilled labour, and potentially reduce wage 
inequality (see for example, Driffield et al. (2009)).  
There is a further consideration within the regional dimension. A large proportion of 
the new inward investment into the UK is attracted to the less advantaged regions of the UK, 
and attracts some form of subsidy within the assisted areas framework. Further, such 
investments are subsidised on the basis that they will generate a given number of new jobs for 
the region, so inward investment into such areas may be expected to have different labour 
market effects from investment elsewhere. Much of the traditional analysis here has focussed 
on “backward” linkages from inward investors, that is the foreign firms purchasing inputs 
from domestic firms. In such cases, much of the evidence suggests that this will have the   8 
effect of increasing the demand for unskilled labour in the supplying industry, and reducing 
wage inequality.  
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between FDI into assisted areas and non-
assisted areas. Investment into assisted areas is eligible for subsidies, on the basis that it 
generates employment in regions with significant structural unemployment. As such, factor 
demand by inward investors in assisted areas is likely to differ from that in non-assisted areas. 
Indeed, our results show that inward investment into assisted areas  increases the demand for 
unskilled workers and reduces wage inequality. This effect is strongest for low skill 
industries, such that these effects are motivated by a simple increase in unskilled jobs, rather 
than by any dynamic effects such as technology spillovers or upskilling. 
III.   The Model 
To identify the link between inward FDI and within-industry shifts in demand towards higher 
skilled labour, we exploit variations in FDI across manufacturing industries and between 
years. The theoretical framework is based upon a flexible translog cost function, following 
Berman et al. (1994). Industry i and the firms f within the industry are assumed to have cost 
functions of the following form: 
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where C represents variable costs, Y is output, K is the capital stock, W is the price of the 
variable factor j, and T is a vector of possible demand shifters e.g. technology. Since cost is 
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normalising on one of the factor prices and applying Shepard’s lemma two factor shares S can 
be derived – skilled and unskilled labour:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i Tj l j i Kj i Yj j ij W W K Y S T ln / ln ln ln f g d d a + + + + =          (2) 
Hence the empirical model, estimated for domestic firms only (f) operating in region (r), 
within the industry (i) over time (t) is as follows: 
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where the dependent variable is the log share of skilled wages in the total wage bill.
3 In 
particular we are interested in examining the impact of FDI upon wage inequality experienced 
in UK owned firms. The simplest model to estimate would be one where the vector of 
demand shifters T is replaced by proxies for, technological change, Tech, international trade, 
Trade, controls for the degree of product market competition such as concentration and 
market share, contained in Z, (where larger firms may have higher wages due to the employer 
size wage effect, Green  et al., 1996), and our primary variable of interest multinational 
activity, FDI: 
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Such an approach is similar to that taken by Taylor and Driffield (2005) based upon 
disaggregated industry level data.  
However, the key contribution that this paper makes is that we are able to consider the 
effects of FDI in greater detail than previous analysis. Specifically, when seeking to evaluate 
the effects of FDI on wage inequality, we make use of several stratifications of the data. 
                                                 
3 Note that relative wage rate for the two types of labour ( ) l j W W /  is dropped due to the possible introduction of 
bias into the estimates as these terms are directly involved in the construction of the dependent variable, this is 
consistent with other work (Berman et al., 1994).   10 
Firstly, we distinguish between local and national effects, by utilising the regional dimension 
to the data, and also allowing for the effect of distance between the inward investors located 
in the UK and the reference plant. Secondly, FDI is classified at the 3 digit level, to allow for 
both inter- and intra industry effects, and thirdly we employ input-output matrices to identify 
whether industries buy or sell from each other, to identify backward or forward FDI. We 
adopt the convention that “backward linked” FDI is inward investment that purchases inputs 
from domestic producers.  Our final estimating equation is thus: 
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where the subscript j (i„j) represents inter industry and the subscript s means outside region 
(r„s) i.e. inter regional. Variables other than those defined above are  _ FWDFDI  and 
_ BWDFDI  representing forward and backward linkages. Those variables which capture 
inter-regional effects are weighted by the square of the distance between regions. 
Incorporating the subscripts we have: 
( ) 1 - irt FDI   Intra industry FDI in the same region 
( ) 1 - ist FDI   Intra industry FDI in outside region 
( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI BWD   Inter industry backward FDI in the same region 
( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI FWD   Inter industry forward FDI in the same region 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI BWD   Inter industry backward FDI outside region 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI FWD   Inter industry forward FDI outside region   11 
Decomposing the wage inequality effects. 
In order to disentangle the impacts of FDI upon the different skill groups (g) we also estimate 
wage levels equations for skilled and unskilled workers, akin to Berndt (1991) and Hijzen et 
al. (2005) . 
( ) firt firt firt
g W e + = X ψ
' ln                    (6) 
We employ a relatively standard GMM-IV estimation here to allow for the endogeneity, not 
just of the capital and output terms, but also of the FDI terms. The analysis of wage inequality 
in the literature essentially treat the “impact” variable, such as trade, technology of FDI as an 
exogenous shock, see for example Acemoglu (2002). This is valid within a model of wage 
inequality, or at least an empirical issue to be tested. However, in models of wage 
determination, it is possible that for example FDI may be attracted to locations with low 
wages, or to locations where new investment is unlikely to bid up wages. We therefore 
estimate the wage equations for both skill-groups, incorporating the full set of inward 
investment terms. This has the advantage in that one might expect structural changes such as 
technology, trade and FDI to have differing impacts upon skilled and unskilled labour. For 
example, intra industry backward FDI in the same region, assuming that FDI is 
complementary to skilled labour, would be expected to increase skilled wages and decrease 
unskilled wages.  
IV.   The Data  
All of the data for this study, with the exception of the input-output, R&D and trade data, are 
taken from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) which is housed at the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). We focus on the years 1980-1995, after which the distinction 
between skilled and unskilled workers is not made in the data.  In terms of identifying 
linkages, we follow the convention employed in the regional science and input-output 
literature, and use input-output tables for the various years. The use of input-output tables in   12 
this way to identify linkages between inward investors and domestic firms is discussed in 
detail in the context of FDI linkages in Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004), in terms of intermediate 
inputs in Hijzen et al (2005) and in a regional science context in Driffield et al (2006), who 
also highlight the assumptions required to employ nationally derived input-out tables with 
regional data. We follow the standard convention and define “backwardly linked” inward 
investment, as the case where the inward investor is upstream from the UK sector, that is that 
it is an industry that purchases intermediate inputs from another identifiable sector. Forward 
linkages by contrast arise when the inward investor sells intermediate output to another 
identifiable sector. Of course, a particular investment can be both backwardly and forwardly 
linked to different sectors simultaneously.  
The ARD contains micro-level data on variables including gross output, employment, 
investment and intermediate goods expenditure, collected by the ONS from its mandatory 
annual survey of UK businesses known as the Annual Census of Production until 1998, and 
now the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI).  Detailed descriptions of this data are provided by 
Griffith (1999), Oulton (1997), Barnes and Martin (2002) and Harris (2002) among others. 
Consequently, only a brief discussion of the data is given here.
4 The summary statistics for 
the internal and external variables are provided in table A1, while the regional distributions of 
inward investment are given in table A2. These highlight significant differences in inward 
investment penetration across regions. Table A2 highlights the almost bi-modal distribution of 
inward FDI in the UK, focussed on the richest regions of the UK, and the poorest. This 
highlights the importance of determining the within, and between region effects when 
examining the impacts of FDI, and also allowing for the distinction between assisted and non-
assisted regions of the UK. 
                                                 
4 These data are discussed in detail in numerous papers, see for example Haskel and Heden (1999), Girma and 
Wakelin (2001), Oulton (2001) and Griffith and Simpson (2002). Equally, these authors discuss the sampling of 
the ARD. Firms with more than 100 employees are always sampled while smaller businesses are sampled 
randomly. As Criscuolo and Martin (2005) outline, these are in effect plant level data.     13 
Input-output tables, as well as the R&D and trade data used in computing the 
technology and trade intensity measures were obtained from the ONS. These data were then 
matched with the ARD data at the 3-digit industry level. 
V.  Estimation 
Our preferred estimator for estimating Equation (5) is the feasible efficient two-step 
instrumental variable (IV) GMM estimator (see Hansen, 1982). This estimator was chosen as 
the primary estimator largely because of the potential endogeneity of at least two of the 
regressors – namely capital and real gross output – which may result in biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the true parameters. Additionally, the instrumental variable GMM 
estimator is more efficient than the conventional IV two-stage least squares estimator in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form. If heteroscedasticity is present, then the 
conventional IV estimator although consistent, is inefficient.
5  
Lagged values of capital and real gross output were used as instruments for the likely 
endogenous regressors. The validity (or lack of it) of these instruments are checked using the 
Hansen J test of over-identification. Additionally, we allow for unspecified correlation of 
error terms within groups (i.e. plants) but not between groups. Although the GMM method 
has the advantage of controlling for potential endogeneity, it can only identify conditional 
mean effects, and could be susceptible to the problem of outliers. 
Accordingly, we also estimated our model using two techniques that are robust to this 
problem: outlier robust and median regressions. 
6The results from these estimators are similar 
to the results reported, so for brevity are not included.  
                                                 
5 It should also be noted that the problems posed by heteroscedasticity for the traditional IV estimator can only 
be partially resolved through the use of heteroscedasticity-consistent or “robust” standard errors and statistics 
(Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003) 
6 The underlying thrust of this estimation procedure is to characterise the most coherent part of the data and thus 
restrict the influence of small groups of observations not representative of the rest of the sample (Temple, 1998). 
These results are available on request from the authors.     14 
Further, it is possible that the empirical methodology that we employ does not enable 
us to fully capture the likely differential effects that FDI has on the wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers respectively. As an alternative (indirect) estimation approach we therefore 
estimate separate wage regressions, using the GMM-IV approach for these two groups of 
workers and infer the differential impacts of FDI on wages from the results. For consistency, 
the wage equations are similar to the specifications employed above, following the analysis of 
Hijzen et al. (2005). 
VI.   Results 
Table 1 demonstrates the results of the impact of FDI on wage inequality, based on the 
estimation of (5) across the various specifications of the model. Market share and industry 
concentration are strongly correlated with wage inequality. Concentrated industries exhibit 
higher levels of wage inequality, while firms with higher market shares exhibit lower levels of 
wage inequality. This is in line with the applied industrial economics literature following 
Sutton (1996, 1998) that suggests that concentrated industries have high levels of capital and 
new technology. The literature discussed above would then suggest that skilled workers in 
such sectors have much higher levels of productivity, with therefore higher levels of wage 
inequality. At the same time, one would expect a degree of rent sharing within the leading 
firms, see for example Blanchflower et al (1996). 
In contrast to more aggregate studies in the labour market impacts of FDI, (Figini and 
Görg, 1999, Taylor and Driffield, 2005) that find that nationally the horizontal effects of 
inward investment are to increase wage inequality, the baseline model shows no significant 
intra-industry national effect on wage inequality of inward investment. Backwardly linked 
FDI acts to reduce wage inequality at a national level, while there is weak evidence of an 
increase locally. This again highlights the two opposite effects here. Inward investment that 
purchases from domestic industry nationally tends to increase the demand for unskilled   15 
workers in the upstream sector, as a result perhaps of outsourcing some low value added 
activities to local producers. Any technology effect of backward linkages leading to greater 
wage inequality is limited to the region of the investment. 
Model 2 includes the technology (R&D) and trade effects. The findings discussed 
above are robust to the inclusion of both trade and technology in the model, and in general the 
effects of imports on wage inequality are insignificant. We also experimented with imports 
into upstream and downstream sectors, though this again proved insignificant.  
Of more interest are the results reported in Model 3, offering a comparison of assisted 
areas with non-assisted areas. The importance of backwardly linked FDI clearly differs 
between assisted areas and non-assisted areas, in that FDI into an assisted area that then 
purchases from local firms acts to reduce wage inequality, while in other areas it acts to 
increase it. This is an important result, and is consistent with development policy with respect 
to poorer areas of the developed world. Encouraging FDI into assisted areas increases the 
demand for unskilled labour locally, thus reducing inequality. This highlights the 
heterogeneous effects of inward investment into the UK, and indeed heterogeneity in FDI 
generally. MNEs are attracted to assisted areas through subsidies, and through the availability 
of large amounts of unskilled labour. As such, firms of this type that then source inputs 
locally are likely to be sourcing low value products, which requires more unskilled labour. 
Conversely, firms entering other parts of the country are attracted by levels of indigenous 
development, and seek to employ more skilled labour – and potentially seeking inputs 
produced by skilled labour. In such cases inward investment then acts to increase wage 
inequality rather than reduce it. Interestingly, FDI in an assisted area, that is backwardly 
linked also has a national effect. This suggests that inward investment into the poorer areas of 
the UK also has a “crowding out” effect, in that it reduces the demand for skilled workers 
elsewhere, thus increasing wage inequality. To further explore this, we carried out various   16 
tests of equality of coefficients across assisted and non-assisted areas. These are presented in 
table 2. One can reject the hypothesis that upstream FDI within the region has the same 
impact on wage inequality in assisted and non assisted areas. Also that the coefficients on 
backwards FDI nationally are different for assisted an non assisted areas. As such backwardly 
linked FDI within a region increases wage inequality, while backwardly linked FDI in 
assisted areas reduces it. The reverse however is true for the interregional effects. 
Downstream FDI however has no asymmetric impact (p=0.179). These findings are robust to 
the inclusion of the trade variables presented in model 4. 
Turning now to the estimation of the wage equations for skilled and unskilled 
domestic workers respectively, the results are shown in Table 3. These models allow us to 
consider whether FDI (or technology/trade) effects are specifically influencing either skilled 
and/or unskilled wage, which is not directly discernible from the wage inequality estimates. 
The wage equations are estimated employing a standard GMM IV estimator to allow for the 
potential endogeniety of the covariates. Technology, as proxied by R&D, has a positive 
influence upon skilled wages at the 5% level. This implies that skill bias technological change 
as does export intensity consistent with the evidence found for the US by Bernard and Jensen 
(1997). Conversely, import intensity has a negative association with both skilled and unskilled 
wages implying a potential role for outsourcing. This sheds some light on the literature 
discussed above, in that both technology and trade are associated with wage inequality, but 
the evidence suggests that these factors are operating via different routes. Interestingly, the 
positive effects of technology and export intensity, where significant, are smaller in absolute 
magnitude than those stemming from import intensity, consistent with the finding of Taylor 
and Driffield (2005) based upon aggregated industry level data. FDI in upstream sectors 
reduces the earnings of unskilled workers, but has no significant impact on the earnings of 
skilled workers. This is consistent with the results for the wage inequality models, and   17 
suggests that the mechanism by which inward investment increases wage inequality, is not so 
much by rewarding skilled workers, as by causing the earnings of unskilled workers to be bid 
down.  
The second set of models illustrate the differences across type of region. Inward 
investment into assisted areas has a positive but insignificant effect on skilled wages, and a 
negligible negative effect on unskilled wages. However, FDI into assisted areas, that then 
sells to UK firms, has an additional negative effect of unskilled wages (and a smaller and 
insignificant negative effect on skilled wages), not merely in the immediate area but 
nationally. This is consistent with the wage inequality results presented above, and again 
highlights the heterogeneous nature of FDI, and of its effects, which typically is ignored in 
econometric work. Finally, model 4 includes both the assisted areas terms, and the trade and 
technology terms, illustrating that the inferences from the earlier specifications are robust to 
these inclusions. 
VII.  Conclusion  
This paper has highlighted several hitherto unexplored findings with respect to the labour 
market effects of inward investment. Firstly, that inward investment into a country such as the 
UK is heterogeneous, and therefore to treat “inward investment” as a homogeneous block of 
capital is erroneous. In general, supporting previous work in this area, we find that FDI does 
act to increase wage inequality at the national level, while the local effects are often different 
from the national effects. This is an important result for policy makers concerned with 
regional development. A concern for some time has been that globalisation, and the FDI 
component of it has acted to increase inequality by increasing the relative return to skilled 
labour. In common with previous work, we find evidence of this, but also that regional policy 
mitigates against this. Inward investment into assisted areas acts to increase the demand for 
unskilled workers, generating employment and reducing inequality. This is consistent with the   18 
aims of policies such as Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) or Selective Finance for 
Investment (SFIE).  
However, FDI into non-assisted areas is generally associated with international 
technology transfer, and interactions between firms engaged in more high value added 
activities. The introduction of new technology by inward investors acts to increase the returns 
on skilled labour, and increase inequality. However, this type of investment has also been 
associated with so called “trickle down” patterns of development, in that such firms outsource 
a lot of their low value added activities, thus increasing demand for unskilled labour 
elsewhere. We find some support for this, in that backwardly linked inward investment 
generates a reduction in wage inequality at the national level, while increasing it at the local 
level, through technology transfer and spillovers.  
This paper therefore highlights the importance of considering linkages, not just in 
terms of technology transfer or spillovers, but in labour market effects. Much of the work 
carried out on the labour market effects of trade or investment have simply looked at 
horizontal, or intra-industry relationships, while this work has shown that the inter-industry, 
and indeed inter-regional effects are potentially greater.    19 
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Oxford Economic Papers, 50,284-321. Table 1: Wage Inequality Estimations  (1980-95) 
Dependent Variable: Log of share of skilled wages in total wage bill. GMM-IV estimation 
  Model 1: 
baseline Model 









Model 4 : assisted 
areas and non-assisted 
areas and including 
Trade & Technology 
Effects 
























































































R&D_INTENSE_1    0.001 
(0.27) 
  0.000 
(0.15) 
IMP_ INTENSE    -0.016 
(-1.02) 
  -0.011 
(-0.69) 
EXP_ INTENSE    0.014 
(0.96) 
  0.010 
(0.65) 
( ) 1 - irt FDI _assist 




( ) 1 - ist FDI _assist 








( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI FWD
_assist 




( ) 1 _ - jst FDI BWD
_assist 




( ) 1 _ - jst FDI FWD
_assist 
























2  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
# of Observations  30,338  29,925  30,338  29,925 
# of Establishments  7,760  7,676  7,760  7,676 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust t values.  Standard errors adjusted for clustering (based on plant 
identifier). All regressions include a constant as well as 2-digit industry dummies. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
.   
Table 2: Tests for equivalence of coefficients across assisted and non-
assisted areas 
Model 3  c
2(1)  p value 
( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI BWD   6.34   0.0118 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI BWD  
8.28   0.0040 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI FWD  
1.80   0.1793 
Model 4     
( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI BWD   5.38  0.0204 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI BWD  
7.22  0.0072 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI FWD  







Table 3: GMM-IV  Estimations  (1980-95) 
























































































































( ) 1 - irt FDI _assist 




( ) 1 - ist FDI _assist 








( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI FWD
_assist 




( ) 1 _ - jst FDI BWD
_assist 




( ) 1 _ - jst FDI FWD
_assist 













2  0.82  0.80  0.82  0.80 
# of Observations  29,518  29,440  29,518  29,440 
Anderson canon. Corr. (identification/IV 
relevance test)  
p-value  
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Hansen J (over-identification instrument 
test) p-value 
0.256  0.036  0.265  0.037 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are z- values. ***  means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5%; 
* means significant at 10%. All variables (except TIME) are in logs.  
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Domestic Establishments 











Share of Skilled Wages in Total Wage 
Bill 
-1.163  0.570  -6.516  0 
K  Real Capital Stock  7.712  1.532  -3.344  15.332 
Q  Total Manufacturing Real Gross Output. 
Deflated by 4-digit producer price index 
8.559  1.488  -5.925  15.850 
MKT_SHARE  Market Share. Measured as plant output 
as a share of 4-digit industry output. 
-5.548  1.611  -15.457  0 
HERFINDAHL  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Sum of the 
squares of market shares 
-3.508  0.924  -5.251  0 
R&D_INTENSE  R&D expenditure as a ratio of  total 
manufacturing real gross output 
0.010  0.249  -6.913  12.498 
IMP_ INTENSE  Total manufacturing imports as ratio of 
total manufacturing real gross output. 
-0.022  0.290  -11.109  7.763 
EXP_ INTENSE  Total manufacturing exports as ratio of 
total manufacturing real gross output 
-0.023  0.303  -10.625  7.554 
( ) 1 - irt FDI   Intra industry FDI in the same region  0.130  0.208  0  1 
( ) 1 - ist FDI  
Intra industry FDI in outside region  2.68e-06  9.76e-06  0  0.0006 
( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI BWD   Inter industry backward FDI in the 
same region 
0.0003  0.004  0  0.2271 
( ) 1 _ - jrt FDI FWD
 
Inter industry forward FDI in the same 
region 
0.0003  0.0047  0  0.2021 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI BWD
 
Inter industry backward FDI outside 
region 
1.32e-08  3.27e-07  0  0.00002 
( ) 1 _ - jst FDI FWD
 
Inter industry forward FDI outside 
region 
1.31e-08  3.49e-07  0  0.00002 
NOTE: All variables (except FDI variables) are in logs. The FDI terms are the share of foreign owned employment in a 
given sector, weighted (where appropriate) by the input-output coefficients to capture links between sectors. As many input-
output coefficients are close to zero, this leads to very small values for the intra- and inter-industry FDI terms. 
  
Table A2: Regional Distribution of Horizontal FDI (Employment Share) 
Region  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
East Anglia  0.153  0.190  0  0.975 
South East  0.137  0.229  0  0.985 
East Midlands  0.141  0.220  0  1 
West Midlands  0.094  0.164  0  0.947 
South West  0.086  0.161  0  0.969 
Yorkshire & Humberside  0.098  0.158  0  0.923 
North West  0.105  0.160  0  0.986 
North  0.153  0.243  0  1 
 Wales  0.170  0.258  0  1 
Scotland  0.166  0.242  0  1 
The maximum values relate to sector/ region specific cases where all of the sector in that region is foreign 
owned. 
 